+ Larger Font | + Smaller Font

Open Forum

The Open Forum on this web-site, is a place where all are welcome with their fresh ideas, suggestions, recommendations, frank opinions and candid comments on practically anything under the sun. Our webmasters will be always accommodative to accept all that you want to say, albeit within the framework of relevance to the Prabodhini's Mission!

The Prabodhini's Mission includes anything and everything about democracy, leadership, good governance and volunteer work, as also development activism, institution building and above all, human development!

All those desirous of contributing to this Forum, should send their articles, essays, features or just plain thoughts to forumeditor@rmponweb.org



The Pioneer http://www.dailypioneer.com EDITS | Thursday, December 17, 2008

Jihadis set new goals

B Raman

Civilians and strategic installations in crosshairs
There has been a major shift in terrorists' target during the last two decades. Now terrorists target human beings -- combatants and non-combatants (civilians) -- as well as capabilities -- economic and strategic. But this was not the case earlier. Till the 1980s, they focused more on targeting human beings. Targeting of capabilities, which may or may not cause human fatalities, came into vogue in the 1980s, when the Irish Republican Army carried out explosions in London's financial district.

Targeting of capabilities does not create the same kind of public revulsion against the terrorists as the targeting of human beings does. Whereas the after-effects of the targeting of human beings remain localised, the impact of the targeting of capabilities has a ripple effect far beyond the area where the act of terrorism is carried out.

After 9/11, the US and the world saw an increase in insurance premia for various business transactions and dislocation of international flights. The terrorist strikes in Bali had an impact on the tourist economy of not only Indonesia but also of neighbouring countries. The effect of a successful terrorist strike on the oil installations of Saudi Arabia or on commercial shipping in the Malacca Strait would be felt right across the world. Similarly, stock markets of different countries would feel the heat if there is a terrorist strike on the IT industry in Bangalore.

Globalisation and decentralisation are the defining characteristics of the business world today. Very often many of the core tasks of multinational companies are performed not by their headquarters in their country of origin but by their field offices spread across the world. Western multinationals delegate many of their core tasks to their offices in India. If an act of terrorism disrupts the working of their Indian offices, it would affect their business in India as well as elsewhere.

Many studies of terrorist operations across the world since 9/11 have brought out how the international terrorist organisations of various hues have successfully adapted for their operations the same concepts and techniques of globalisation and decentralisation, which they have borrowed from the business world. They are globalised in their thinking and outlook and decentralised and autonomous in their operations in the field.

The terrorist strike in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 has sent shivers everywhere because it was planned and executed to the minutest details and was carried out through remote control from Pakistan with the help of not more than 10 terrorists. There might have been more involved in various peripheral roles. A force of nearly 600 men of the Mumbai Police and the National Security Guards was required to eliminate this small group of 10. This was asymmetric urban warfare of a kind not seen in the world ever since terrorism assumed its major dimensions in the post-1967 world after the Arab-Israeli war of that year.

We saw in Mumbai a mix of attacks on human beings and capabilities, a mix of attacks on Indians and foreigners and a mix of various strategies. A strategy to disrupt the peace process between India and Pakistan was mixed with a strategy for reprisal against the expanding strategic cooperation of India with Israel and the Western world. A strategy for discrediting India's political leadership and professional national security managers in the eyes of the Indian public was combined with a strategy for discrediting them in the eyes of the international community and the international business world. These strategies focussed both the man in the street like railway station, hospital and other public places and the elite in the Taj and the Oberoi hotels.

These hotels are not just the favourite spots of tourists who travel on shoestring budgets but also of the cream of the international business world, who come to Mumbai for their business. Imagine what impressions the business managers, who escaped being killed by the terrorists, would have carried back to their corporate headquarters -- about the security of life and property in India; about the efficiency of India's national security managers; about the quality of our political and professional leadership.

Terrorist attacks directed against economic and business targets have a tactical, strategic and economic impact. The tactical impact is in respect of replaceable damages. The strategic impact has a long-term effect on the profitability of their business operations, an increase in their expenditure on physical security, and an increase in their tax liability due to a surge in Government spending on counter-terrorism for which the money has to come from the tax-payers. It has been estimated that the 9/11 terrorist strikes have resulted in a one-third increase in the expenditure on counter-terrorism in the US Defence Department alone. The total US expenditure on counter-terrorism now amounts to US $ 500 billion per annum, which is 20 per cent of the total federal budget.

The National Commission in the US, which went into the 9/11 terrorist strikes, pointed out that there was no culture of joint action in the US counter-terrorism community. We have no culture of joint action either. The basic principle underlying the concept of joint action is that every organisation in the counter-terrorism community is individually and jointly responsible for preventing an act of terrorism. Had we developed this culture of joint action, we would not be seeing the unedifying spectacle of the intelligence agencies, the Navy and the Mumbai Police blaming each other for not preventing the Mumbai strike.



Other Articles